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1. Analyse the view that superpowers’ intervention in the Middle-East was ‘a necessity and a tragic error’.

The Middle-Eastern conflict arose out of the regional rivalries that embodied not just the Arab-Israeli dispute but also other serious rivalries within the Arab world and other problems and conflicts within individual Middle Eastern states that led to superpower intervention. It is arguable that the superpowers’ intervention was inevitable and hence a necessity to the US and Soviet Union themselves as both had economic and geopolitical stakes in the area. Yet, it was a tragic error for the most part as interference worsened the already precarious Middle-Eastern climate. On the other hand, it could be disputed that this intervention was a necessity to the Arabs and Israelis as a means of not only giving them the opportunity to manipulate the Soviet Union and US, but to also maintain a way of ‘controlling the situation’ lest it explode out of control as it nearly did during the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

For the superpowers, by intervening in the events of the Middle-Eastern conflicts ensured that it kept up the globalization of the Cold War as it provided economic aid and military supplies to their allies in the region. For the USA, the Eisenhower Doctrine embodied the main necessity of why the USA had to intervene – to ensure that the influence of their competitor the Soviet Union was reduced – by securing strategic alliances with Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. The goal was to safeguard the pro-Western governments of Jordan and Iraq against the spreading turmoil, and to station fighting forces (the US Sixth Fleet). Similarly, the use of arms sale while being a necessity to the superpowers in establishing themselves in the region, only served to be a tragic error as it continued the legacy of a major arms race, client-patron relationships and the uneasy alliances that countered the effectiveness of the US’ policies. Likewise, Soviet intervention in the sense of it acting as an alternative supplier of arms to the Arab world was also a tragic mistake. While it saw successes in establishing better relations with Egypt and Syria, the arms traffic would worsen the conflict between Arab states and Israel and respectively induce US to develop closer ties with Israel. The Soviet Union’s Shepilov Doctrine also allowed the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the Middle-East, as Egypt had heavy control over the Syrian and Jordan armies. Hence, we can see that indeed for the superpowers, intervention in the form of channeling economic and military aid to their proxies was a necessity as it was the only way to ensure their influence in the region. However we cannot deny that it was a horrible mistake because of the massive aftereffects of not being able to fully control their proxies, which led to greater consequences on both the superpowers’ parts.

Superpower intercession was necessary in the means for proxy wars to be conducted, at the same time wearing out their patrons. The US’ initial foray into aiding Egypt was definitely a gamble, especially after US intervention proved to be their own mistake when they intervened in a civil war in Yemen (1962) as it further drove Nasser into the arms of the Soviets who no doubt helped to keep the crisis going with Nasser’ demands for large amounts of aid. The war of attrition after the 1967 war sought to exhaust the other side gradually over a long period, hence wearing out their patrons who were forced to aid their proxies. It was clear that while neither side wanted direct confrontation with the other, neither side could win without help from their patrons. How these proxy wars turned out to be a catastrophic blunder for the superpowers, and the Soviets in particular, was the fact that these proxy wars had begun to spin out of control as seen in the 1973 war. Not only were the Arabs losing faith in the USSR (and hence defeating their aims of being in the Middle East), when the war spun out of control, Sadat had to request that both superpowers intervene to enforce a ceasefire as the Israelis refused to desist. The main tragedy was in the fact that the superpowers’ intervention although clearly a necessity, was a result of their initial globalization of the Cold War into the Middle-East. However, in the case where reconciliation was being set up by the US, the fact that the Russians saw that there was more to be gained by ending the constant state of crisis, and instead of interfering stood aside also shows that this sort of intervention (as this respect of peace depended on the Soviets as much as it did on the US) was not a ‘tragic error’.

The superpowers needed to gain strategic influence in the Middle-East, and thus to them intervention whenever possible was an inevitability, despite the consequences. For the US, the strategic grip of the Southern borders of the USSR was necessary to contain the spread of communism. It saw the arrival of numerous defense arrangements in the Middle-East, such as the 1955 Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), which the US saw as an important link in the chain of anti-communist alliances. However, by supporting the Pact, it proved to be a mistake as the Arabs saw it as ‘neo-colonist’ and it ended up worsening the situation in the Middle-East. Similarly, the Soviet Union saw it as a threat and tried to subvert it by championing the cause of states like Egypt and Syria. The Soviet Union saw the need to have parity with the US and thus expanded its strategic influence by gaining what Kissinger called “a Soviet military base” in Egypt. The Soviets were granted naval facilities and other significant concessions as a result of the Soviet sponsored intervention during the Yemeni civil war. Of course, by limiting its strategic influence to Egypt and the Arab states, it proved to be a somewhat fatal mistake for the Russians especially after Egypt’s disastrous defeat in the 1967 war as her credibility as a reliable patron was undermined. Essentially, it was Sadat’s anti-Communist crackdown that ensured the tragedy of whatever the Soviets had helpfully intervened in. It ultimately demonstrated that neither a major presence nor heavy dependency would necessarily bring (strategic) influence to the patron and that the superpowers were always vulnerable their client’s change of policy or attitude.

As for the Middle-Eastern states, it was generally believed by them that they viewed the superpowers’ intervention as a means to further exploit their patrons and at times, these interventions were also viewed as a hindrance. And yet, superpower intervention in relation to the Middle-Eastern crisis was not a ‘tragic error’ as it was necessary to keep the situation from escalating into a nuclear disaster.

To the Middle-Eastern states, they saw the superpowers’ intervention as an excuse to manipulate the power politics between the two in extracting military and financial support. Sadat’s political maneuverings showed indirectly how the superpowers’ intervention was a necessity as it meant that they could be used for the Middle-East’s own ends. In switching sides from the Soviets to the Americans, Sadat showed how little influence (and hence how much intervention would have worked) the Soviets had over Egypt. Furthermore, by citing the US as a ‘practical choice’ as only the US could be pressure on Israel and provide a large enough amount of economic aid undermined whatever authority the Soviets had. However, an example of how this sort of entrepreneurial statecraft had an indirect adverse effect on the Middle-Eastern states as a result of the (gradual) involvement of the superpowers, would be Nasser’s balancing one superpower against the other. It was a necessity as it allowed him the freedom to choose which side he wanted to ally with. Instead, in the long run it turned out to be a ‘tragic error’ as by drawing both superpowers deeper into the Middle-East conflicts, it saw the escalation of the situation.

Similarly, the Middle-Eastern states had their own control over their invasion, rendering whatever intervening power the superpowers had as null and became supporting allies. Evidently, the Six-Day war saw the Soviet’s intervention as a necessity on the Arabs’ part, as the Soviet Union was compelled to launch a diplomatic offensive against Israel under Arab pressure. The Arabs clearly need their patron’s military support and had no qualms about making use of them. Similarly, the Egyptians had not consulted the Soviets during the attack of the Yom Kippur War (hence rendering the superpower’s authority useless) and intervention only became a necessity when the world was put on nuclear alert. Of course, in this case superpower intervention was not ‘a tragic error’ because it managed to control the boiling climate and led to the Camp David Accords and further peace talks such as a number of UN Resolutions.

The fact that the Middle-Eastern states hardly had any sense of ideological allegiance, instead expediency, in a way justified the superpowers’ intervention as ‘necessary’ as it was needed to push their client states in the direction they wanted. On the other hand, it can be considered a tragic error in the sense that more often than not, their client states actually listened to them. This can be seen in Sadat’s changing allegiance as seen above, and the fact that Nasser could actually ban Communist parties despite the Soviet Union’s help. Ultimately, it was clear that whatever superpower intervention there was, there were limits to their influence. Following that strain of thought, the special relationship US had with Israel always served as a liability in establishing friendly relations with the Arab states. The incident where Saudi Arabia took part in the OPEC oil embargo not only indicated US’ limited control over her clients but also highlights the tragic mistake of the US intervening in Israel’s favour.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that while the superpowers’ direct involvement in the Middle-East was a necessity in most cases, serving to control and abate many crises, it was a tragic error for them to even intrude upon the already aggravated conflict, leading them to near nuclear-wars and direct confrontation.

My call out to the public, friends, enemies, whatever, if you have the time to go through it. Does my essay seem remotely argumentative? Nevermind the factual inaccuracies, if there are any. I'm more concerned about whether I'm actually trying to get my point, whatever you perceive it to be, across. I'm not the world's most effective writer, but I try my best and I'm proud to be consistent in what I do.

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